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RULE 10b-5: THE CIRCUITS DEBATE THE
EXCLUSIVITY OF REMEDIES, THE PURCHASERSELLER REQUIREMENT, AND CONSTRUCTIVE
DECEPTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)1 and
Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-52 are the principal mechanisms investors use to remedy fraudulent securities transactions.3 Courts
have construed the elements of a section 10(b) cause of action' broadly in
order to effectuate the congressional goal of full disclosure. 5 Recent Su- 15 U.s.c. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest for the protection of investors.
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b) of the '34 Act,
see note 1 supra, by the Securities Exchange Commission, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means of
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purbhase or
sale of any security.
3 See, e.g., Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1974); Bums
v. Paddock, 503 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir. 1974). See also 5 A. JACOBS, THE ImpAcT OF RuLE. 10b-5
§ 1 (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as JACoBS]; Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891, 892 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Lowenfels].
' To state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must allege that the defendant,
acting with scienter, employed a materially deceptive or manipulative practice in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security. See Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1236
(D. Del. 1978); Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Additionally, the
Rule lOb-5 plaintiff must have suffered an actual loss as a direct result of the defendant's
conduct. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
5 See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 660-61 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (standing granted under Rule 10b-5 though plaintiffs not purchasers or sellers of security); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972)
(non-deceptive corporate mismanagement actionable under Rule 10b-5); Vanderboom v.
Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970) (negligence suffi-
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preme Court decisions defining the parameters of section 10(b), however,
have reversed this liberal interpretative trend by restricting defrauded
plaintiffs' access to federal court." In the past year, lower courts wrestled
with specific interpretations of section 10(b) in light of the Supreme
Court's broad mandates.7
A. Rule 10b-5 and Section 18: The Conflict Between Express and
Implied Remedies
Federal courts readily have granted persons injured by fraudulent securities transactions a remedy under section 10(b) despite the absence of

explicit statutory language providing a private right of action.8 Courts imcient to establish Rule 10b-5 liability). See also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2
(1933) (purpose of Securities Act is to promote investor protection through full disclosure).
"Full disclosure" is a term of art which denotes public disclosure of all material facts surrounding a securities transaction. See Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.
1974).
6 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (non-deceptive
breaches of fiduciary duty not actionable under Rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (proof of scienter necessary for recovery in a private damage action
under Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738-39 (1975)
(private plaintiff must be-purchaser or seller of security for standing under Rule 10b-5). See
generally Lowenfels, supra note 3, at 892; Note, JudicialRetrenchment Under Rule 10b-5;
An End to the Rule as Law, 1976 DuKE L.J. 789, 790.
7 See Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 1979); Alabama Farm Bur.
Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fid. Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1979); Lincoln Nat.
Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,
598 F.2d 1017, 1032 (6th Cir. 1979); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979);
Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1979).
' See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951). See generally Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b5: JudicialRevision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. L. REv. 627 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Ruder]. The Supreme Court began implying private rights of action in Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Rigsby, the Court implied a private cause of action under
the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Subsequent to Rigsby, the Court has granted private
rights of action under a wide variety of federal statutes. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting Rights Act of 1969); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899).
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Supreme Court adopted an expansive
view of implied private remedies under the federal securities laws. In Borak, the plaintiff
sought relief for damages incurred as a result of misleading proxy statements violative of §
14(a) of the Securities Act 1933. Id. at 429-30. Reasoning that the SEC alone could not fully
enforce § 14(a), the Court held that the goals of the '33 Act necessitated implication of a
private remedy. Id. at 432-33. Furthermore, the Borak Court encouraged lower courts to
imply private remedies under other sections of the securities laws. Id. at 433. In decisions
subsequent to Borak, however, the Supreme Court sub silentio declined to follow Borak's
expansive remedial doctrine. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412, 418 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). Finally, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979),
the Supreme Court explicitly declared that Borak's liberal approach is no longer good law.
Id. at 290. See generally Note, Implication of PrivateActions From Federal Statutes: From
Borak to Ash, 1 J. CoRP. L. 371, 376 (1976).
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ply a private remedy under section 10(b) in order to insure widespread
compliance and to effectuate the congressional goal of investor protection
through full disclosure.9 The Supreme Court, influenced by an overwhelming judicial consensus, has confirmed without substantive discussion the existence of a private right of action under section 10(b). 1 ° This
recognition, however, does not necessarily grant defrauded plaintiffs a
Rule 10b-5 cause of action in every case. In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder," the Court explicitly refrained from deciding whether private actions may lie under section 10(b) for transactions that also violate
section 18 of the '34 Act.12 Section 18 creates an express private remedy
for false or misleading statements in documents filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)."8
9 See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369, 373 (3d Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson,
203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953). See also 78 CONG. REc. 2770-71 (1934) (statement of Sen.
Fletcher) ('34 Act designed to insure full disclosure to investors).
10 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972). Although the district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania first implied a private right of action under § 10(b) in 1946,
see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the Supreme
Court did not explicitly recognize this private cause of action until 1971. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
11 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

2 Id. at 211 n.31; cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 n.15
(1975) (question left unresolved whether Rule lOb-5 action will lie for conduct proscribed by
express remedies in the '33 Act).
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided
in subsection (d) of section 780 of this title, which statement was at the time or in
light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement,
for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in
any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of the suit, and assess
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees against either party litigant.
(c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting
the cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued.
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976); see text accompanying notes 22-24 infra.
Is 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Congress intended that the language of § 18 encompass
omissions as well as misrepresentations. See In Re Pennsylvania Cent. Secs. Litigation, 357
F. Supp. 869, 876 (E.D. Pa. 1973); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1934); cf. 15
U.S.C. § 78(i)(4) (1976) (omissions not actionable under § 9(a)(4) of the '34 Act). Filing a
document with a stock exchange will give rise to a § 18 remedy even though the defendant
did not file the document with the SEC. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783,
788 (2d Cir. 1951). However, if the defendant fies a misleading document with an agency
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Recently, the Second Circuit, in Ross v. A. H. Robbins Co.,14 held that

the existence of an express remedy under section 18 of the '34 Act does
not preclude implication of a section 10(b) private right of action."6 In
Ross, the plaintiffs claimed that the A. H. Robbins Co. and its directors
made material misstatements and omissions about the safety and effectiveness of the "Dalkon Shield," a birth control device manufactured and
marketed by Robbins. 17 Robbins' annual report, 10-K forms,18 and a
stock prospectus contained the alleged misrepresentations.' The plaintiffs, suing on behalf of a class of similarly situated purchasers of Robbins' stock,20 charged that the misrepresentations had artificially inflated
other than the SEC, § 18 provides no remedy. See Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F.
Supp. 1089, 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (documents filed with Interstate Commerce Commission
not actionable under § 18); Gann v. Bernz Omatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (misrepresentations in non-fied documents not actionable under § 18).
14 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
18 A majority of courts have held that § 18 is the "catch-all" civil liability provision for
violations of the reporting requirements of the '34 Act. Thus, most courts have refused to
imply private rights of action under the individual reporting requirements. See, e.g., DeWitt
v. American Stock Transfer Co., 433 F. Supp. 994, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (§§ 13(a) & 15(d));
Meyers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), afl'd mem., 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976) (Q 13(d)); In Re Pennsylvania Cent. See.
Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1127, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afl'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974) (Q

13(a)).
The '34 Act requires filing of a wide variety of documents with the SEC. Section 13(a)
contains the most important reporting requirement. Under § 13(a), most publicly held companies must submit an annual report on Form 10-K and provide other financial and nonfinancial information about their operations during the course of a year. See 15 U.S.C. §
78m (1976). See generally 5 JAcoBs, supra note 3, § 3.02[h] (discussion of all filing requirements under '34 Act).
18 607 F.2d at 556. Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Ross, no federal circuit
court had decided whether plaintiffs might proceed under § 10(b) for conduct proscribed by
§ 18(a). The district courts have reached divergent conclusions. Compare McKee v. Federals, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,958, at 96,923 (E.D. Mich.
1979) and Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,760, at 94,474-75 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (§ 18 is exclusive remedy for misrepresentations in material filed with SEC) with Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1006 & n.15 (D.D.C. 1978) and Seiden v. Nicholson, 69
F.R.D. 681, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (§ 10(b) action may lie for conduct covered by § 18).
17 607 F.2d at 548-50. The Ross plaintiffs alleged that the defendants recklessly disregarded information indicating the inaccuracy of statements concerning the effectiveness of
the Dalkon Shield, and that the defendants predicated their misrepresentations upon insufficient test data. Id. at 548-49. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed
to correct their misrepresentations in a timely fashion. Id. at 550.
18 Form 10-K contains year end financial and nonfinancial information about a publicly
held company. See generally 2 L. Loss, SEcunrr~sS REGULATION 811-17 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss).
19 607 F.2d at 549. The plaintiffs in Ross alleged that the defendants' misrepresentations appeared in several press releases as well as in documents filed with the SEC. Id.
Material misrepresentations in press releases give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability. See Mitchell
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir. 1971). Presumably, then, the Second
Circuit did not need to address the exclusiveness of the § 18 remedy.
20 A plaintiff seeking to represent a class must be a member of the protected class and
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the price of the company's securities.2 1 The plaintiffs sought relief under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.2 2
Although the plaintiffs in Ross sued under Rule 10b-5, section 18
would have provided an express remedy for the defendants' conduct since
the alleged misrepresentations appeared in documents filed with the
SEC. 23 In order to proceed under section 18, a plaintiff must have relied
on the misrepresentation in purchasing or selling a security, and the misrepresentation must have affected the value of the security.24 A defendant
may escape liability with the affirmative defense that he acted in good
faith and without knowledge of the inaccuracy of his statements. 25 The
district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Congress intended
section 18 to be the exclusive remedy for conduct proscribed by that
28
section.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court and concluded
that private plaintiffs may proceed under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations in documents filed with the SEC.27 In analyzing whether section 18
is an exclusive remedy, the court declined to employ the methodology for
determining legislative intent used by the Supreme Court in implied private right of action cases. 28 The Ross court reasoned that the Supreme
have suffered injury in the same manner as class members. See East Tex. Motor Freight
Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977). See generally Block & Warren, New Bat-

tles in the Class Struggle-The Federal Courts Reexamine the Securities Class Action, 34

Bus. LAw.

455 (1979).

607 F.2d at 550. Subsequent to public disclosure of the Dalkon Shield's ineffectiveness and safety problems, the value of A.H. Robbins Co. stock dropped from $19 to $13 a
share. Robbins' stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
11

Is Id.
23 Id. at 553.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). The SEC considers the § 18(a) requirement that plaintiffs
prove that the defendant's misrepresentation affected the price of the security a major disincentive to the use of § 18(a). See Loss, supra note 18, at 1753-54. In the 1941 Amendments to the '34 Act, the Commission unsuccessfully sought to strike the requirement. See
SEC REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SECUrris AcT OF 1933 AND THE SECURrTES EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934, H.R. COM. PuNr, COM. ON INT. & FR. CoMMERcE, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1941).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
2' Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 904, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The district
court in Ross analyzed the '34 Act's legislative scheme in holding that § 18 precludes the use
of § 10(b). The district court reasoned that the procedural and substantive requirements of
§ 18 manifested Congress' intention that § 18 act as an exclusive remedy. Id.
27 Id.
at 554; see text accompanying notes 34-53 infra.
18 Id. at 553. The Supreme Court has adopted a two-step test for determining whether
to imply a private right of action. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.
Ct. 242, 249 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1979); Note,
Section 17(a) of the '33 Act: Defining the Scope of Antifraud Protection,37 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 859 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Defining the Scope of Section 17(a)]. The Court's
initial consideration is whether Congress intended to create a private remedy in favor of the
plaintiff. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. at 249. In determining legislative intent, the Court examines whether the plaintiff is the intended beneficiary of
the statute and whether the statute's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
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Court's analytical framework was inapplicable" because courts already
recognize an implied right of action under section 10(b).30 Upon examining several recent Supreme Court decisions, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that remedies in the securities acts are never exclusive.31
Instead, the court adopted a nullification test which would prohibit plaintiffs from invoking an implied remedy if the terms of the implied remedy
would unjustifiably nullify the procedural and substantive limitations of
the competing express remedy.3 2 The court reasoned that allowing an implied remedy where nullification exists would encourage circumvention of
33
the carefully drawn express remedies included in the securities acts.
The Second Circuit's analysis began by noting that plaintiffs seeking
to establish reliance 8' on misrepresentations face a more difficult task
under section 18 than under section 10(b).3 5 In a Rule 10b-5 action,
courts presume reliance once a plaintiff establishes materiality or proves
provide a private remedy. The Court also determines whether implication of a private right
of action would be consistent with the overall legislative scheme. See Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 99 S. Ct. at 2489. See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). If the Court's
legislative intent analysis indicates that Congress did not intend to provide a private remedy, the Court will not imply a right of action. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 100 S. Ct. at 249; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. at 2489. If Congress
intended to create a private remedy, however, the Court further determines whether state
law so traditionally covers the defendant's alleged conduct that implication of a federal remedy would be inappropriate. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. at 2489; see also
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
29 607 F.2d at 553.
3 See text accompanying

notes 8-10 supra.
607 F.2d at 554. The Ross plaintiffs relied on the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v.
National Securities, 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969), as authority for the proposition that Congress
intended the remedies in the securities acts to overlap. In National Securities, the Court
held that an overlap between § 10(b) and § 14 of the '34 Act does not limit either remedy.
Id. at 468. The Ross court recognized that recent Supreme Court decisions have limited the
liberal philosophy of National Securities. 607 F.2d at 554.
31 607 F.2d at 553. See also Note, The Exclusivity of the Express Remedy Under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 845, 856-58 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Express Remedy].
607 F.2d at 554-55.
34 Courts often consider the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 in the context of causation. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). Under this approach, causation has two elements. First, plaintiffs must establish "transaction causation" by showing reliance on a defendant's misrepresentation in purchasing or selling a security. Second, the plaintiff must establish "loss causation" by proving that the defendant's misrepresentation adversely affected the value of the
security. See id.; Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1246-49 (D. Del. 1978).
35 607 F.2d at 552-53.
' See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970). See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement
in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARv. L. REV. 584 (1975).
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
a misrepresentation is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider the misrepresentation important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449.
Although Northway involved an alleged violation of § 14(a), the circuit courts have readily
31
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that the material misrepresentations affected the open market price of
the stock.3 7 Under section 18, courts do not recognize constructive reliance.38 The section 18 plaintiff must plead and prove actual
reliance 9 on
40
the misrepresentation in purchasing or selling a security.
While this difference seemingly supports the conclusion that section
18 is an exclusive remedy, the Second Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff's
burden of establishing scienter41 under section 10(b) offsets the relative
advantage of not having to prove actual reliance. 42 Under Rule 10b-5, the
plaintiff has the burden of averring specific facts which imply that the
defendant acted with scienter. 43 Under section 18, however, a plaintiff
adopted the materiality standard in § 10(b) cases. See, e.g., Joyce v. Joyce Beverages, Inc.,
571 F.2d 703, 707 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
37 See Blackie v. Barack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975). Inflation in the market price
of a stock immediately after a material misrepresentation circumstantially establishes that
market traders relied on the misrepresented facts. See id.; Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
" See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 130, 133 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp.
213, 220-21, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366,
399 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (constructive reliance permissible in class action under § 18).
39 Accord, Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969); Barotz v. Monarch Gen., Inc. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,933, at 97,237 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see 5 JACOBS, supra note 3, § 3.02[h], at 1104 n.22; 3 Loss, supra note 18, at 1753 n.227 ("actual reliance" should encompass reliance
upon abstracts of documents filed with SEC).
"1 See 5 JAcoBs, supra note 3, § 3.02[h], at 1-104, 5.
41 Private plaintiffs proceeding under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must plead and prove
that the defendant acted with scienter. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976). Scienter is also the culpability standard under § 18. See Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [1979 Transfer Binder] 1 96,760, at 94,975 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Most courts
consider reckless behavior sufficient to meet the scienter requirement. See, e.g., Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). See generally Bucklo, The
Supreme Court Attempts To Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 29 STA. L. Rav. 213 (1977); 1978-1979 Securities Law Developments: Rule
10b-5, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 901, 923-30 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1978-1979
Developments].
42 607 F.2d at 556.
43 See Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521-22 (10th Cir. 1973). FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) is the
basis for the requirement that plaintiffs aver specific facts which establish the implication of
scienter. 607 F.2d at 557. The primary purpose of Rule 9(b) is to insure that defendants
have reasonable details concerning their challenged conduct. See Weinberger v. Kendrick,
432 F. Supp. 316, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). When a complaint fails to meet the specificity requirement of rule 9(b), courts dismiss the action but liberally allow the plaintiff to replead.
See Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 1977); cf. Mooney y.
Vitolo, 435 F.2d 838, 839 (2d Cir. 1970) (court denied plaintiff alleging fraud under Rule
10b-5 leave to amend on third attempt). See generally 2A MOORE'S Fmmm PRACTICE 1
9.03, at 9-25, 39 (3d rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's].
In Ross, the court held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege the specific facts
necessary to raise the inference of scienter. 607 F.2d at 558. The court found that the plain-
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states a cause of action merely by showing that a document filed with the
SEC contained a misrepresentation and that the plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation. 44 While. section 18 also requires that the defendant act
with scienter, the court presumes the mental state once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. 45 The burden in a section 18 action is on the

defendant to prove the absence of scienter. 4 6 The Ross court concluded
that this burden of proof allocation adversely affects section 10(b) claims
since plaintiffs may have difficulty alleging the specific facts necessary to
survive a motion to dismiss. 47 Thus, the Second Circuit held that de-

frauded investors enjoy no substantive advantages by proceeding 48under
section 10(b) rather than under the express remedy of section 18.
The Ross court also relied on policy considerations in holding that section 18 is not an exclusive remedy. Initially the court stated that predicating the availability of Rule 10b-5 upon misrepresentations in an SEC
filing might deny all remedies to some investors.4 Finding that open market investors have become one of the chief beneficiaries of Rule 10b-5
protection,"0 the court reasoned that the current Congress would not condone basing Rule 10b-5 liability on such a delineation.51 Additionally, the
court speculated that forcing plaintiffs to proceed under section 18 rather
tiffs failed to allege facts showing that the defendants were aware of information which
raised serious doubts about the safety and effectiveness of the Dalkon Shield. Id. The court
also found that the plaintiffs failed to allege when the defendants became aware of the
defects in the product. Id. Finally, the complaint failed to specify the time period during
which the price of Robbins' stock fell. Id. at 559. The Second Circuit remanded Ross with
instructions that the district court provide the plaintiffs leave to amend. Id.
"" See Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 190, 195 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); 3 Loss, supra note 18, at 1752.
"5See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.31 (1976); 3 Loss, supra note
18, at 1752.
,e See note 45 supra.
'v 607 F.2d at 556; see note 43 supra.
48 607 F.2d at 556. The Ross court failed to address expressly the impact of the procedural requirements in § 18. Plaintiffs proceeding under § 18 must satisfy a one year statute
of limitations and courts may require a plaintiff to post bond to cover court costs and attorney's fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976); text accompanying notes 80 & 81.
4, 607 F.2d at 556. Currently, many plaintiffs seek relief under Rule 10b-5 for misstatements in SEC filings because of an inability to satisfy the substantive or procedural requirements of § 18. See 5 JACOBS, supra note 3, § 3.02[h], at 1-106. Thus, denying these plaintiffs
a remedy under Rule 10b-5 would effectively preclude litigation of their claims under the
federal securities laws. 607 F.2d at 556.
50 607 F.2d at 556; Thill Securities Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir. 1970).
Cf. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (investors are not exclusive beneficiaries of '34 Act).
"' 607 F.2d at 556. The Ross court's concern with whether the current Congress would
concur in the court's decision is misguided. In interpreting statutes, courts seek to effectuate
the legislature's intent at the time of the statute's enactment. See 2A SANDS, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIO § 45.05 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SANDS]. Thus, reaction
of the current Congress to a particular decision is irrelevant to a judicial inquiry. Cf. Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) (Congress should enact private right of
action if Court's decision unacceptable).
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than under section 10(b) would encourage officers and directors to incorporate their misrepresentations in documents filed with the SEC. 2" The
Second Circuit reasoned that such incorporation would insulate these potential defendants from section 10(b) liability since once the misrepresentations appeared in an SEC filing, section 18 would become the only
available remedy.58
In construing the federal securities laws," the Supreme Court seeks to
effectuate congressional intent in enacting the contested statute.5 5 In determining legislative intent, courts employ extrinsic and intrinsic aids.5 6
Intrinsic aids involve examining the text of the statute and inferring congressional intent from the statute's composition and structure. 57 Extrinsic
aids are sources indicating legislative intent which are found outside the
text of the act.58 The primary extrinsic aid is legislative history. 9 While
the Second Circuit's nullification analysis is an intrinsic aid in statutory
construction,"° the analysis does not provide a comprehensive view of
congressional intent in enacting the '34 Act. The Second Circuit should
have employed the analytical framework used by the Supreme Court in
determining whether to imply a private right of action. 1
The first part of the Supreme Court's analysis involves a mode of statutory construction for discerning legislative intent.6 2 Courts should employ this legislative intent methodology in exclusivity of remedy cases because the methodology represents the Supreme Court's choice of how to
607 F.2d at 556.
Id.
, The primary federal securities laws are: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77aa (1976 & Supp. 1 1978); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1976 & Supp. H1 1978); the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z
(1976 & Supp. II 1978); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §8 80a-1 to 52
(1976 & Supp. H 1978); and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 8§S0b-1 to 21
(1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
88 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 418 (1975).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Plasterers' Local No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 127 (1971); Dent v. St.
Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1969).
87 See 2A SADs, supra note 52, § 47.01. Intrinsic aids are generalizations of customary
legislative intent in drafting statutes. Id. Thus, for example, when specific words follow general words in a statutry enumeration, courts restrict application of the general term to
things similar to those enumerated. See, e.g., Smith v. Nussman, 156 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla.
App. 1963) (slingshot not considered "pistol or other arm or weapon"). See also 2A SANDS,
supra note 51, §§ 47.17 to 47.22 (doctrine of ejusdem generis).
88 See 2A SANDs, supra note 51, § 48.01. Extrinsic aids provide background information
about the purpose of the statute, events surrounding the statute's enactment and post-enactment statutory history. Id. § 48.01, at 181.
89 See id. § 48.02.
o See id. § 47.02; note 57 supra. Nullification analysis presumes that the legislature
would not enact a provision which would encourage plaintiffs to ignore other applicable
provisions within the same act. See id. § 47.03, at 72.
61 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
6*See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Defining the Scope of
Section 17(a), supra note 28, at 869-71.
82

53
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assess the impact of intrinsic and extrinsic aids on an ambiguous statute.
The Court concludes that Congress intended an implied right of action
under a statute if the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of -the statute
and if the legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress either
explicitly or implicitly intended to create a private remedy." The Court
then examines whether implication of a private right of action would be
consistent with the overall legislative scheme of the Act.6 This final con65
sideration is analogous to the Second Circuit's nullification analysis.
Thus, the Second Circuit failed to consider the legislative history of section 18. The fact that the Second Circuit only considered one part of the
Court's three prong test demonstrates the inadequacy of the nullification
analysis.
The Supreme Court's decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc.6 further supports application of the Court's test to determine the
existence of a private cause of action. In Piper,the Court held that courts
may imply a private right of action under section 14(e) of the '34 Act in
favor of tendering shareholders but not in favor of a defeated tender offeror.17 The selective delineation of a private remedy in Piper indicates
that recognition of an implied right of action may depend upon the status
of the petitioner.68 Thus, judicial recognition of a private remedy under
section 10(b) does not necessarily mean that courts should imply a right
of action in favor of every class of plaintiffs. 6' Since the Supreme Court
has sanctioned selective implication of private remedies, lower courts
should use the Court's analytical framework to determine whether particular classes of plaintiffs have standing to invoke the section 10(b) private
0
right of action.7

Application of the Court's legislative intent test militates against implication of a section 10(b) remedy in cases involving conduct actionable
under section 18. Investors are clearly one of the prime beneficiaries of
section 10(b).7 1 The legislative history of section 10(b), however, indicates
that Congress did not intend that an implied remedy under section 10(b)
extend to conduct proscribed by express remedies.72 Congress enacted
' See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-70 (1979). In examining legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to provide a private remedy, courts
examine other legislation comparable to the contested act. If the comparable legislation contains express remedies but the act does not, courts infer that Congress did not intend to
provide any remedy. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct, 242, 248
(1979); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 468 F.2d 862, 883 (2d Cir. 1978) (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 248 (1979).
"' See text accompanying notes 75-77 infra.
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
67 Id. at 37-41.
" See generally 1978-1979 Developments: Implied Rights Action, supra note 41, at
947-48 (1979).
" See Express Remedy, supra note 32, at 860.
"0 See text accompanying notes 71-80 infra.
" See note 50 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
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section 10(b) for the express purpose of providing the SEC with the authority to enjoin manipulative and deceptive conduct not otherwise prohibited by the '34 Act."3 Consequently, the legislative history of the '34
Act suggests that the conduct proscribed in section 18 is beyond the reach
74
of section 10(b).
The final consideration in the legislative intent analysis is whether implication of a private remedy is consistent with the overall legislative
scheme of the Act.7 5 In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,7 6 the Supreme
Court ruled that an implied remedy which is significantly broader than an
applicable express remedy is inconsistent with the legislative scheme of
the '34 Act." Although all courts recognize that the stringent reliance re78
quirement of section 18 makes that remedy narrower than section 10(b),
most courts and commentators do not conclude that the plaintiffs' burden
of alleging scienter significantly restricts the potential use of section
10(b). 79 Furthermore, section 18 contains a restrictive statute of limitationss" and bonding requirement8 1 that have in practice discouraged potential plaintiffs from proceeding under section 18.52 Because of section
73 See Hearings on Stock Exchange RegulationBefore the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (remarks of Thomas G. Corcoran; §
10(b) is catch-all provision to enable SEC to deal with new manipulative devices); Ruder,
supra note 8, at 658-59 (Q10(b) designed to give SEC enforcement power over manipulative
devices new and unknown in 1934).
,' See Ruder, supra note 8, at 659.
71 See text accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra.
7 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
77 Id. at 573-74. The Court in Touche Ross stated that considerable evidence supported
the view that Congress intended § 18 to act as an exclusive remedy. Id. at 574 n.15.
73 See 5 JAcoBs, supra note 3, § 3.02[h], at 1-106 n.26.
79 See Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1251 (D. Del. 1978); Pearlstein v.
Justice Mortgage Advisers, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,760, at
94,975 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Patrick, The Impact of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: Pleadingwith
Particularity,8 INST. SEc. REG. 381, 383 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pleadingwith Particularity];Express Remedy, supra note 32, at 856-57. Some courts allow plaintiffs limited discovery in order to more fully develop their scienter allegations. See, e.g., Bishop v. Sklar,
Civ. No. 75-H-618-5 (N.D. Ala. 1975). But see Segan v. Dreyfus Corp., 513 F.2d 695, 696 (2d
Cir. 1975). Additionally, all courts liberally grant leave to replead. See note 43 supra. Leave
to replead provides plaintiffs with the opportunity of gathering additional facts through
informal or state law means. See Pleadingwith Particularity,supra at 384.
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1976). Under § 18, potential plaintiffs must file suit within
one year after learning of misrepresentation and, in any event, within three years after the
defendant made the misrepresentation. Id. By contrast, § 10(b) does not prescribe a limitations period. Courts apply the limitations period of the state remedy most similar to § 10(b).
The law of the forum state is the controlling authority. See Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co.,
611 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1979) (New Jersey's common law fraud remedy most analogous to
§ 10(b), thus six year limitations period applied); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber &
Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 406 (D. Colo. 1979) (Colorado blue sky statute identical to § 10(b);
three year statute of limitations applied).
81 52 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976); see Rhoadside v. Kenmore, [1974-75] FaD. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,958, at 97,290 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Linchuck v. Cooper, 43 F.R.D. 382, 384-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
s' See Pearstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [1979 Transfer Binder] Mmn. Sac. L.
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18's restrictive reliance and procedural requirements, section 10(b) appears to be significantly broader than section 18. Thus, application of the
Supreme Court's legislative intent analysis indicates that Congress intended section 18 to act as an exclusive remedy.
B. Pledges of Securities after Blue Chip
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,83 the Supreme Court restricted standing under Rule 10b-5 to plaintiffs who actually purchased or
sold a security.8 Although the Blue Chip decision clearly ended the lower
court practice of creating exceptions from the section 10(b) purchaserseller requirement, 5 the Court failed to articulate the elements of a
purchase or sale.8 " Thus, courts can continue to apply Rule 10b-5 broadly
87
through liberal interpretations of the definition of a purchase or sale.
The securities acts define a sale as the disposition of a security or interest
in a security for value.88 In the past year, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
REP. (CCH) 1 96,760, at 94,975 (N.D. Tex. 1978); 5 JACOBS, supra note 3,
83

§

3.02[h], at 1-105.

421 U.S. 723 (1975).

" Id. at 754-55. In Blue Chip, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-corporation
fraudulently dissuaded investors from purchasing the corporation's stock by circulating a
misleading prospectus. Id. at 725-26. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to proceed under Rule 10b-5 as they had neither purchased nor sold the defendant-corporation's securities. Id. at 755. The Court reasoned that the statutory language of
§ 10(b) clearly manifested congressional intent to restrict standing under that section to
actual purchasers or sellers. Id. Additionally, the Court concluded that the absence of a firm
purchaser-seller requirement would encourage vexatious litigation. Finally, the Court noted
that a non-purchaser or non-seller bases his claim almost entirely on oral testimony. The
Court reasoned that oral proof is too speculative to form a basis of liability under § 10(b).
Id. at 747.
85 Prior to Blue Chip federal courts recognized several exceptions to the purchaserseller requirement in § 10(b). See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974)
(injunctive relief exception); James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973) (de
facto seller exception); Heprich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (derivative action
exception); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967) (forced seller exception); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (aborted transaction exception). See generally Gallagher, 10b-5 After Blue
Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak, 80 DIcK. L. REv. 1, 36-41 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Gallagher]; 1977-1978 Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 35 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 799, 801 n.5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977-1978 Developments]. See also 5 JACOBS, supra note 3, § 38.01[e], at 2-61, 2-79 (discussing exceptions to purchaser-seller requirement after Blue Chip); Note, Standing Under Rule 10b-5 after Blue Chip Stamps, 75
MICH. L. Rav. 413, 431-37 (1976).
14 See Note, The Pendulum Swings Further: The "In Connection With" Requirement
and PretrialDismissals of Rule 10b-5 Private Claims for Damages, 56 TEx. L. REv. 62, 91
(1977) [hereinafter cited as PretrialDismissals].
7 See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 414 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 939 (1979) (capital call constitutes purchaser or sale); Rochelle v. Marine Midland
Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1976) (reissuance of securities constitutes
purchase or sale).
" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(3), 78(e)(a)(14) (1976). Despite slight differences in the statutory language defining a sale under the '33 and '34 Acts, see note 100 infra, courts interpret
the two definitions in the same fashion. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. All Ameri-
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have reached conflicting results on whether a pledge of stock is the sale of
a security under the '34 Act.8"
In Mansbach v. Prescott,Ball & Turben,9° the Sixth Circuit held that
a pledgor of securities has standing to sue under Rule 10b-5. 1 In Mansbach, the plaintiff pledged a large number of corporate bonds to a brokerage house as collateral for stock transactions.9 2 Several months later, after
a dispute with the brokerage house, the plaintiff demanded return of his
bonds.93 The defendant delayed returning the bonds for five weeks. During this time, the market price of the bonds declined significantly.94 Upon
receiving the bonds, the plaintiff immediately sold them and filed suit
under Rule 10b-5.9 5 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on
can Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1978); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller &
Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
965 (1977).
a, Compare Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979) (pledge
of securities is purchase or sale) with Lincoln National Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038 (7th

Cir. 1979) (pledge of securities not purchase or sale); see text accompanying notes 90-142
infra.
90 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979).
91 Id. at 1029. A pledge is a bailment of personal property to secure a loan or guarantee
performance of an obligation. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 128 (2d ed.
1955). Since a creditor can only perfect a security interest in an instrument under the
U.C.C. by taking possession, U.C.C. § 9-304(1), the use of stocks and bonds as collateral
must take the form of a pledge. See L. LARKIN & H. BERGER, A GUIDE TO SECURED TRANSAC-

6 (1970). In a pledge transaction, legal title remains with the pledgor but the pledgee
acquires a property interest in the security. See SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334
F. Supp. 444, 456 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1973). If the pledgor satisfies the loan obligation, the pledgee must return the securities. Should the pledgor default,
however, the pledgee may foreclose and take full legal title. See note 139 supra;see generally J. WHITE & S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 754-55 (1st ed. 1972).
TIONS

92 598 F.2d at 1019.

Id. at 1019-20.
" Id. at 1020-21. The plaintiff in Mansbach settled his account with the defendant on
May 20, 1974. The brokerage house, however, refused to return the pledged bonds until the
plaintiff executed a written release absolving the defendant from all liability in connection
with disputed option trading. Although the plaintiff never executed the release, the brokerage.house ultimately returned 295 of 300 pledged bonds on July 8, 1974. During the period
between May 20 and July 8, the market price of the bonds allegedly dropped by approximately $55,000. Id.
95 Id. at 1021. Although defrauded parties in pledge transactions have remedies readily
available under the UCC and state common law, plaintiffs generally seek relief in federal
court. See L. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRrms REGULATION 992-94 (1977). Rule 10b-5 is
procedurally more advantageous than state remedies because plaintiffs may gain nationwide
service of process and venue for both federal claims and pendent state claims. See Mariash
v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974); Allegaert v. Warren, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,189, at 96,532 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1976). Additionally, federal plaintiffs enjoy more liberal discovery and class action rules.
See 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURrIES LAW: FRAUD §§ 2.5(3), 2.7(2) (1968); Comment, Commercial
Notes and Definition of a Security under Security Exchange Act of 1934: A Not is a Note
is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. Rlv. 478, 509 (1973).
'1
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the grounds that the defendant's alleged conversion 8 was not "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"' 7 as is required by section
10(b). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that a pledge of
securities falls within the '34 Act's definition of sale. 8
Rather than articulating independent reasoning for granting the plaintiff standing, the Mansbach court expressly adopted the rationale of the
Second Circuit in Mallis v. FDIC.99 In Mallis, the court concluded that a
pledge satisfies the '34 Act's definition of a sale.1"' The court based its
decision on the fact that a pledgee and an investor assume an identical
investment risk that the securities will remain valuable. 101 In addition to
relying on Mallis, the Sixth Circuit justified its holding on the ground
" See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra. Any unauthorized act which deprives an
owner of his property either permanently or for a limited time constitutes conversion. See
Quaker Oats Co. v. McKibben, 230 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1956).
9 598 F.2d at 1022.
98 Id. at 1029.
9 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977). In Mallis, the pledgee plaintiffs filed suit under Rule
10b-5 for release of cancelled securities from an escrow account. Subsequent to release, the
cancelled securities were used as collateral for a personal loan. Id. at 826-27. The Second
Circuit held that a pledge of securities constitutes a purchase or sale within the meaning of
§ 10(b). Id. at 830.
100 568 F.2d at 829. n holding that a pledge transaction is the purchase or sale of a
security, the Mallis court relied on a case involving a criminal prosecution under § 17(a) of
the '33 Act. See United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976). Commentators criticize Mallis' reliance on Gentile because of the arguably broader
definition of a sale in the '33 Act. See, e.g., Comment, Pledge of Securities in a Loan Transaction Held to Constitute a Sale-Mallis v. F.D.I.C., 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 660 n.67 (1977).
The '33 Act defines a sale as a contract for disposition of a security or interest in a security,
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976), whereas the '34 Act defines a sale as a contract to sell or otherwise dispose of a security, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1976). Since courts construe the '33 and
'34 Acts as one body of law, see note 125 infra, criticism of Gentile's value as precedent is
erroneous. Even courts which hold contrary to Mallis recognize that the '34 Act's definition
of sale encompasses pledge transactions. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d
1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1979); National Bank of Commerce v. All American Assurance Co., 583
F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1978).
101 548 F.2d at 829; accord, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,738
(summarizing Brief for SEC, SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 920 (5th Cir.
1973)). While the Sixth Circuit in Mansbach adopted the reasoning of Mallis, the court also
sought to distinguish factually the Fifth Circuit's decision in National Bank of Commerce v.
All American Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978), which held that a pledge transaction is not a purchase or sale. The Mansbach court reasoned that All American was inapplicable because the Fifth Circuit limited the All American holding to pledges made in connection with commercial loans which do not affect the securities industry. Id. at 1029.
Although the plaintiff in Mansbach pledged bonds in connection with traded securities, see
text accompanying notes 92-95 supra, the Sixth Circuit's distinction is untenable. The All
American court's distinction of a pledge from a sale rested on the commercial rather than
investment nature of the transaction. 583 F.2d at 1300. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
pledgees are not investors because pledgees may not sell the security except in the case of
default and they do not benefit from an appreciation in the security's value. Id. Similarly,
the pledgee-broker in Mansbach could only take title to the bonds through foreclosure, see
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-503 (Baldwin 1969), and could not recover more than the
amount of the pledgor's debt, see id. § 355.9-504(2).
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that treating a pledge of stock as a sale is consistent with Blue Chip.02
The court stated that the principal policy concern of Blue Chip was the
elimination of potential fraud in litigation based exclusively on oral
proof.103 The problems of oral proof are not present in pledge cases, however, because written documentation supports pledge transactions. The
court thus characterized a pledge as an empirically verifiable event involving a specific amount of stock.10 4
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Lincoln National Bank v.
Herber'05 rejected the reasoning of Mallis and denied a defrauded
pledgee standing under Rule 10b-5. 106 In Lincoln National,the defendant
pledged counterfeit stock certificates as collateral for a commercial
loan.10 7 Upon default, but prior to foreclosure, 0 8 the pledgee-bank discovered that the stock certificates were counterfeit and brought suit under
10 9
Rule I0b-5 and section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33. Act).
Additionally, the bank alleged that the defendant's conduct constituted
common law fraud. 110 The district court held that while the pledge of a
security is not a sale, foreclosure by the bank is a forced purchase"' cov102 598 F.2d at 1029-30; see note 84 supra.
103

598 F.2d at 1030; see note 95 supra.

104 598 F.2d at 1030.

105 604 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1979).
26 Id. at 1045. The Lincoln National decision conflicts with Wright v. Heizer Corp.,
560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978) where the Seventh Circuit
found the defendants liable under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations made in connection
with a pledge of corporate stock. Id. at 252. The Wright court, however, failed to consider
whether the pledge transaction satisfied the purchaser-seller requirement. Cf. SEC v.
Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1282 (7th Cir. 1974) (pledge of securities is sale in SEC injunctive
action under § 17(a) of '33 Act).
107 Lincoln National Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Sales of
counterfeit and forged securities are actionable under both the '33 and '34 Acts. See Seeman
v. United States, 90 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1937).
108 Actual foreclosure satisfies the purchaser-seller requirement of Rule 10b-5. See Boss
v. Crowell-Collier and MacMillian, 565 F.2d 602, 611 (9th Cir. 1977); McClure v. First Nat'l
Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
10' 414 F. Supp. at 1274. Section 17(a) of the '33 Act prohibits fraudulent acts in connection with the offer or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Unlike § 10(b), § 17(a)
does not provide relief for defrauded sellers of securities. See Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d
455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971). See generally Hazen, A Look
Beyond the Pruningof Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. RED. 641 (1978).
110 414 F. Supp. at 1274. In order to recover for common law fraud, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant, acting with scienter, made a false representation of a material
fact. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that he justifiably relied on the misrepresentation
and suffered damages as a consequence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 525 (1977).
See generally Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §§ 105-110 (4th ed. 1971); Note,
Fraud and Its Remedies, 4 Tsx. L. RED. 510 (1926). When a defendant is liable under both
Rule 10b-5 and a pendent common law fraud claim, courts restrict the plaintiff's recovery to
the maximum amount recoverable under either claim. See, e.g., Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d
367, 377 (10th Cir. 1973); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1971).
" See note 113 infra.
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ered by the federal securities laws.11 Since valueless stock had secured
the loan, however, the district court ruled that a constructive foreclosure
had taken place upon default since actual foreclosure would be perfunctory. 113 Although the pledgee-bank had standing under the constructive
foreclosure doctrine,"' the trial court granted summary judgment in favor
1 15
of the defendants on other grounds.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment but repudiated the theory of constructive foreclosure without
discussion.1 ' The Lincoln National court instead focused on the more
fundamental issue of whether a pledge transaction is the purchase or sale
of a security. 17 The court conceded that the pledge of a security falls
within the definition of "sale" under the '33 and '34 Acts, 1 but concluded that courts should not literally apply the definitions found in the
two acts.1 9 The Seventh Circuit held that courts must construe definitions in the context of the legislative purpose behind the '33 and '34
21
Acts 20 and in light of the economic realities underlying a transaction.
In following this broad mode of analysis, the court found that a pledge is
not a sale. Initially, the court examined the legislative history of the '33
Act. 22 Relying on a passage from the Senate Report on the '33 Act, 2 ' the
112 414 F. Supp. at 1278.
113 Id. The district court's theory of constructive foreclosure in Lincoln National
is
analogous to the forced seller doctrine. Under the forced seller doctrine, a plaintiff who has
not actually sold a security has standing under Rule 10b-5 if the defendant's conduct is
certain to force a sale in the future. See Gallagher, supra note 85, at 8-9 n.39. Courts reason
that delaying the suit until the actual sale takes place is a "needless formality." Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir. 1967). Although the forced seller doctrine is
an exception to the purchaser-seller requirement, the doctrine has survived the Supreme
Court's decision in Blue Chip. See Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1330,
1331 (D.D.C. 1977). See also 1978-1979 Developments, supra note 41, at 907-911.
114 414 F. Supp. at 1278. See generally Note, A Pledge of Stock in a Commercial Loan:
"Purchase or Sale" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 669,
681-83 (discussing constructive foreclosure doctrine).
11 604 F.2d at 1039. The district court decision granting summary judgment is unpublished. Id. at 1039 n.1.

116Id. at 1044.
117 Id. at 1040.
118 Id. at 1040-41; see note 100 supra.
"9 The definitions in the '33 and '34 Acts

apply literally "unless the context otherwise
requires." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c (1976). Courts often use this context-over-text provision to
alter the statutory definitions found in the securities acts. See, e.g., Ballard & Cordell Corp.
v. Zoller & Dannenberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 965 (1977) (definition of security); Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, 368 F.
Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1973) (definition of broker).
12 604 F.2d at 1041; see text accompanying notes 122-127 infra.
1. 604 F.2d at 1041; see text accompanying notes 128-138 infra.
121 604 F.2d at 1041. See generally ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES ACT oF 1933 AND THE SEcURTIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) (compilation
of pertinent congressional documents).
113 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); text accompanying note 155 infra.
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court concluded that Congress intended to protect only investors. 1 4 Since
courts construe the '33 and '34 Acts as one body of law,125 the Lincoln
Nationalcourt reasoned that investor protection in the securities markets
was the purpose of the '34 Act. 28 The court concluded that the pledge
12 7
transaction in Lincoln National had no effect on any security market.
The court also interpreted Congress' failure to include pledges explicitly
in the definition of a sale as an indication that Congress did
not intend
1 28
that the '34 Act regulate pledges of securities as collateral.
Upon finding that Congress intended only to protect investors, the
Lincoln National court reasoned that the protections of the '34 Act are
limited to investment transactions.229 The Seventh Circuit, in determining whether a transaction is of an investment or commercial nature, relied
on two Supreme Court cases construing the definition of a security.130 In
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel' and United Hous1 32
ing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman,
the Court rejected literal application
of the definition of a security and instead looked to the economic realities
of the challenged transactions. s Although the alleged securities in both
Daniel and Forman peripherally involved an investment decision, the
Court held that the '33 and '34 Acts did not cover the alleged securities
since the plaintiffs purchased the shares primarily for non-investment
124

604 F.2d at 1041. Accord, Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1977). But see

text accompanying notes 149-159 infra.
'" See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
" 604 F.2d at 1042. Since the '34 Act extends the '33 Act's policy of full disclosure to
the subsequent trading of securities in secondary markets, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976), the Lincoln National court reasoned that a pledge transaction
must affect the securities markets in order to constitute a sale. 604 F.2d at 1042. Contra,
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971) (coverage of § 10(b)
not limited to transactions which affect a securities exchange or organized over-the-counter
market).
'IT 604 F.2d at 1042. The pledgor in Lincoln National borrowed $842,000 from the
pledgee-bank to finance a business controlled and to repay an outstanding loan. Id. The
court concluded that use of the funds for such purposes did not affect the securities markets. Id. But see 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3)(a) (one purpose of '34 Act is controlling amount of
national credit used in securities markets).
1" 604 F.2d at 1042. The Lincoln National court noted that the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 includes pledges within the definition of sale. 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(23)
(1976). The court reasoned that the absence of a similar express inclusion in the '33 and '34
Acts indicates that Congress did not intend to regulate pledge transactions. 604 F.2d at
1042. The Seventh Circuit's reasoning is faulty, however, because Congress intended a broad
definition of the statutory terms in the securities acts. See H.R. RP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Seas. 11 (1933). Consequently, Congress purposely used language less specific than language
found in subsequent securities legislation. See 1 Loss, supra note 18, at 512 n.163.
1 604 F.2d at 1042.
2:0 Id. at 1042-43.
13, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
132 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
'" See 439 U.S. at 558;, 421 U.S. at 851-52. See generally 1978-1979 Developments,
supra note 41, at 847-868.
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purposes.' " Thus, the Lincoln National court ruled that the purpose or
motive underlying the pledge of securities is the preeminent factor in
considering whether a pledge is a sale.1" 5 In accepting securities as collateral, a pledgee enters into a transaction on the assumption that foreclosure will not occur. 38 While the pledgee takes an investment risk that the
security has and will continue to have value, the court concluded that
banks accept pledged securities primarily for the purpose of making a
commercial loan.'3 7 The court reasoned that a pledgee's potential ownership of the securities does not change the commercial nature of the transaction."3 ' In addition to the legislative history of the '33 and '34 Acts, the'
Lincoln National court based its decision on the availability of state remedies. The court noted that the pledgee-bank could seek relief under the
140
Uniform Commercial Code 3 9 and in an action for common law fraud.
The court interpreted the availability of these remedies as a further indication that Congress did not intend to regulate pledge transactions.141
The court. reasoned that sound judicial policy forbids extension of the
federal securities laws to transactions normally regulated by the states. 42
'3 In Daniel, the Court considered whether a noncontributory compulsory pension
plan constituted a security. 439 U.S. at 553. The plaintiff alleged that he invested in the
plan by accepting employment and premised his acceptance on the successful management
and investment of the pension fund's assets. Id. at 561. The Court rejected the plaintiff's
assertions, holding that the need for employment rather than desire to invest was the principal reason for participation in the plan. Id. at 562. Similarly, in Forman, the Court held that
the purchase of "shares" in a non-profit housing cooperative was primarily a housing transaction rather than an investment transaction. Although the purchasers might profit from
the leasing of commercial space and tax benefits, the Court refused to hold that the shares
constituted securities since the tenants bought the shares principally to acquire housing. 421
U.S. at 858.
139 604 F.2d at 1043.
"31 Id. at 1043; see L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PLEDGES § 554 (1883).
137 604 F.2d at 1043.
I" Id. at 1043. The Lincoln National court noted that the risk that a pledgor is not the
owner of the collateral exists whether or not the collateral involves securities. Id.
139Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a "purchaser" includes a pledgee. U.C.C. § 1201(32) & (33). Thus, the pledgee-bank in Lincoln National had a remedy under the U.C.C.
See U.C.C. §§ 8-301, 8-306, 8-316, 8-320. See generally Note, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 1013 (1979).
Upon default, a pledgee may foreclose and take legal title to the collateral. A pledgee
has the option of selling the pledged securities, U.C.C. § 9-504(1), or retaining possession of
the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-505(2). If a secured party chooses to retain the collateral, a pledgor
may at his discretion force a sale within 30 days. U.C.C. § 9-505(2). See generally Note,
Article 9, Part5: Rights, Remedies and Liabilities Under Default, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 93
(1978). Although foreclosure is a pledgee's primary means of collecting a debt, the pledgee
may ignore the collateral and sue the pledgor directly. U.C.C. § 9-501(1). Direct suit is the
only viable option when the collateral involves valueless or counterfeit securities. See R.
HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-5 (1973).
140 See note 110 supra.
I 604 F.2d at 1044.
142 Id. But see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (existence of
state law remedy not dispositive of whether Congress intended to provide similar federal
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The initial consideration in statutory construction is the language of
the statute. 143 Since Congress expressly intended broad interpretations of
the statutory definitions in the '33 and '34 Acts,1 4" a majority of courts
have concluded that pledges of securities as collateral fall within the literal definition of a sale. 145 Courts look beyond statutory language, however, when legislative intent suggests a different interpretation. 146 Both
the Mallis and Lincoln National courts ruled that the congressional purpose underlying the securities acts justified a departure from the language
defining a sale.1 47 Upon concluding that Congress enacted the '33 and '34
Acts solely to protect investors, the courts reasoned that a pledge transaction is a sale only if the pledgee is an investor in the pledged securities. 148
The conclusion in Mallis and Lincoln National that Congress only intended to protect investors is untenable, however, when considered in
light of United States v. Naftalin.1 49 In Naftalin, the Eighth Circuit had
found that the language of section 17(a) of the '33 Act 50 prohibited the
defendant's conduct.151 The court nevertheless vacated the defendant's
conviction because the alleged fraud did not affect investors. 52 The
Eighth Circuit, like the Mallis and Lincoln National courts, ruled that
under the securities acts Congress intended to protect only investors. 5 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's contention
that a transaction must have an impact on investors in order to fall
within the purview of the '33 Act.1 The Court examined the legislative
history of the '33 Act, including the Senate Report relied upon by the
remedy); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976) (rights and remedies of federal securities laws supplement
all other remedies). See generally 5 JACOBS, supra note 3, § 11.01.
143 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1979); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976).
144 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
145 See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d at 1041; National Bank of Commerce v. All American Assurance Corp., 583 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978); Mallis v. FDIC,
568 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1977).
146 See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (actions may be within letter
of statute, but not covered by statute because not within statute's spirit nor within intention
of Congress).
147 See 604 F.2d at 1041; 568 F.2d at 829.
148 See text accompanying notes 99-101 & 123-138 supra.
14 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
"1'

See note 109 supra.

151579 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1978). Naftalin, the defendant, engaged in a fraudulent
"short selling" scheme by placing orders with several brokerage houses to sell securities
which he falsely represented that he owned. Id. at 446.
15 Id. at 448. The Eighth Circuit noted that only the defrauded brokers suffered losses
as a result of Naftalin's actions. The brokers' purchase of replacement shares shielded the
investors who originally bought the fraudulently sold securities from any injury. Id. at 447.
Consequently the Eighth Circuit reasoned that Naftalin's actions did not have an impact on
an investor. Id. at 448.
18"

Id. at 447-48.

154

441 U.S. at 775-76.
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Lincoln National court,8 5 and concluded that investors are not the exclusive beneficiaries of the securities acts. 156 The Court ruled that Congress
also intended to protect ethical businessmen 1 7 and honest corporate business. 5 8 According to the Court, Congress passed the '33 and '34 Acts in
order to impose a high standard of business ethics on every facet of the
securities industry. 5 9
Since the scope of the securities acts extends beyond investor protection, the debate among the circuits as to whether the pledge of securities
is an investment or commerial transaction is pointless. Courts should adhere to a literal application of the statutory definition of sale because
there is no evidence of contrary legislative intent. 60 The preamble'' to
the '34 Act further supports the conclusion that the pledge of securities
constitutes a sale under the securities acts. One of Congress' express purposes in enacting the '34 Act was the fair valuation of securities pledged
as collateral for bank loans.' 62 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Lincoln National not only violates a canon of statutory construction, but
also conflicts with express congressional intent underlying the '34 Act.
C. Constructive Deception Under Rule 10b-5
Although mere breaches of fiduciary duty are not actionable under the
federal securities laws,' 6 ' shareholders may sue derivatively under the anSee note 123 supra.
441 U.S. at 775.
187 Id. at 776; see 77 CONG. REc. 2925 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Kelly; '33 Act intended
"'

'

to protect ethical businessmen); 77 CONG. REc. 2983 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Fletcher; ethical businessmen are beneficiaries of '33 Act).
'" 441 U.S. at 776; see 77 CONG. REC. 2935 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Chapman; '33 Act
designed to protect not only investing public but also honest corporate business).
1'9 441 U.S. at 775 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 18687 (1963)).
180 See note 146 supra.
161When a statute contains unclear and ambiguous terms, courts rely on the preamble
to the legislation as an indicator of legislative intent. See, e.g., U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 533-34 (1973) (Food Stamp Act of 1964); Lehigh & New Eng. Ry. Co. v. I.C.C., 540 F.2d
71, 79 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977). See generally 2A SANDS, supra note
51, § 47.04.
162 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(3)(c) (1976). In considering whether a pledge transaction constitutes a sale, courts have ignored congressional concern for the fair valuation of bank collateral. But cf. Franklin Nat. Bank v. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (bank granted implied cause of action under § 15 of '34 Act partly because Congress
intended '34 Act to ensure fair valuation of securities as collateral). Presumably, the courts
considered the legislative history of the '33 and '34 Acts to be a sufficient indication of
legislative intent. But see 2A SANDS, supra note 51, § 48.01, at 182 (extrinsic aids alone are
insufficient to determine legislative intent).
161 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). See generally Note, Section 10(b): All
That is Unfair is Not Fraud,19 B.C.L. RIv. 939 (1978); Note, "Fraud"Does Not Encompass Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 8 S'roN HALL L. Rav. 762 (1977).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, several circuits had held that fraud
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tifraud provisions of the '34 Act when material deceptions"" or manipulations0 5 accompany corporate overreaching. 6 Since the corporation is the
real party in interest in a derivative action,' 67 the court must initially determine whether the defendant deceived the corporation.'
If the plaintiff establishes deception, the court must then decide whether the misrepresentation was material.6 9
under Rule 10b-5 included breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1973); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
See also Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded for
considerationof mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976) (breach of fiduciary duty action lies under
Rule 10b-5 despite full and fair disclosure). See generally Jacobs, The Role of Securities
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of CorporateManagement, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
27 (1973).
I" Deceptive conduct under Rule 10b-5 involves affirmative misrepresentations, omissions, and the concealment of information indicating the misleading nature of a prior statement. See SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), a'fld,
448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971). A defendant may deceive a plaintiff either by verbal or nonverbal conduct. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (misleading press release); Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1966), afl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (aiding and abetting). See generally 5 JACOBS, supra note
3, at §§ 60-67; Bromberg, DisclosureProgramsFor PublicallyHeld Companies-A Practical Guide, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1139.
'" Manipulation, a term of art in securities litigation, describes intentional conduct
designed to defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of a security.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). See generally 5A JAcoBs, supra note
3, §§ 138-41; Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, 56 YALE L.J. 509 (1947).
2" See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 249 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1066 (1978). But see Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1362-63
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (no liability under Rule 10b-5 for breaches of fiduciary duty even if nondisclosure). See generallyNote, Suits for Breach of FiduciaryDuty Under Rule lob-5 After
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HRv. L. REv. 1874 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5].
167 See 3B MooRE's, supra note 43, 1 23.1.16. A shareholder derivative action permits a
stockholder to assert a claim on behalf of the corporation when the corporation has refused
to proceed on its own behalf. See generally FED. R. Cri. P. 23.1; 3B MooRE's, supra note 43,
23.1.16, 23.1.21. Since the corporation is the real party in interest in a derivative action,
the corporation rather than the plaintiff-shareholder must satisfy the necessary statutory
requirements. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1970) (corporation, not plaintiff, must be purchaser or seller of securities in § 10(b) derivative action).
Some states statutorially allow "special litigation" committees of disinterested directors
to terminate shareholders derivative suits. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1978); CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West 1978). In Burks v. Lasker, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979),
the Supreme Court held that federal courts must resolve two questions in deciding whether
to ratify derivative suits dismissed by directors pursuant to state statutes. Initially, courts
should determine whether the relevant state law allows the board of directors to delegate
the power to move for dismissal. Then, courts must consider whether the state law is consistent with the federal policies underlying the plaintiffs' securities claim. Id. at 1838.
'
See text accompanying notes 185-211 infra.
161 See text accompanying notes 212-266 infra.
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Courts rely on the concept of constructive deception in assessing
whether a defendant deceived a corporation. 1 0 As legal entities rather
than real persons, corporations may only act through their stockholders,
officers or directors.1 7 1 State law and the corporation's by-laws and articles of incorporation govern which of these parties may be agents of the
corporation for a particular transaction.17 2 Since courts presume that
principals possess the knowledge of their agents, 173 reliance on a misrepresentation by a corporation's agent establishes corporate deception
under Rule 10b-5.' 4 Thus, when a securities transaction requires only the
approval of the board of directors,1 7 5 a defendant may rebut an allegation
of corporate deception by proving that the directors were aware of all
pertinent facts surrounding the purchase or sale. 7 6 However, when a majority of the directors has a conflict of interest'" in a given matter, courts
do not attribute the board's knowledge to the corporation. 78s The knowledge of an agent does not affect the principal if the agent acts for his own
benfit and against the principal's interest. 79 In effect, the parties never
created an agency.' 80 Unlike a normal principal, a corporation may only
"
' Faced with a conflict of interest, courts identify the
act through agents. 18
majority shareholders with the board of directors.8 2 Minority shareholder's become the corporation's decision-making body by default.'8 3
Under this theory of constructive deception, a self-dealing board of direc170

See Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544, 550-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (memorandum).

See Sherrard, Federal Judicial and Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEa L. REv. 695, 699 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sherrard]. See
171

also H.

HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS

§§ 78-80 (1970).

See Sherrard, supra note 171, at 699.
'73 See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 26 (7th Cir.). See also 5A JACOS, supra note 3, § 118.01, at 5-66.
174 See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 1977); 3 W. FLErCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COPORATIONS § 790, at 21-23 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
175 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (1975) (directors responsible for all general
business of the corporation); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1977-78).
178 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969); Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 166, at 1881.
177 See text accompanying notes 185-211 infra.
17s See Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 249 (7th Cir. 1977); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1968).
179 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 282(1) (1958). A principal, however, may
ratify an agent's conflict of interest. Id. §§ 236, 376. Once the principal acceeds to an agent's
conflict of interest, courts impute the agent's knowledge to the principal. 2 MECHEM ON
AGENCY § 1824 [hereinafter cited as MECHEM]. Thus, shareholders may ratify directors' conflicts of interest. See Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E. 429 (1955) (fully informed shareholders can ratify fraudulent acts).
172

,,0 See 2 MECHEM, supra note 179, § 1824.

Sherrard, supra note 171, at 669.
18 See note 183 infra.
'8 See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 26 (7th Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v.
181 See

Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally Fleisher, "FederalCorporation
Law:" An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1163 (1965) (discussing decision-making body
concept).
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tors has a duty of full disclosure to all shareholders under Rule 10b-5. 1 "
The determination of whether a conflict of interest exists is the first
8 5 the
step in a constructive deception analysis. In Maldonado v. Flynn,"
Second Circuit recently examined the standards necessary for establishing a director's conflict of interest.""5 The Maldonado court, in affirming
the district court's dismissal of the action, held that approval of a transaction by a majority of disinterested directors is an absolute defense to a
claim of corporate deception.187 In Maldonado, the inside directors of
Zapata Corporation were beneficiaries of an employee stock option
plan. 8s Immediately prior to Zapata's tender offer for repurchase of its
own shares at a premium, the board amended the stock option plan to
allow the inside directors and other officers early exercise of their stock
options.189 The corporation also provided these officers and directors with
interest free loans to finance the stock purchases and attendant tax liabilities. 90° Plaintiffs filed a shareholder derivative suit under Rule 10b-5, alleging corporate deception as a result of the board's failure to disclose the
final amendments to the stock option plan.1 91
184 See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 1977). Directors have a duty to
disclose only the facts of a particular securities transaction. Rule 10b-5 does not require
directors to characterize their dealings in pejorative terms. Id. at 218 n.8. See Bucher v.
Shumway, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %97,142, at 96,300 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (directors
not required to characterize transaction as perpetuation of management's control); Wellman
v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no duty to disclose payment of premium for director's shares); Goldbarger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no
duty to describe transaction as unfair). Additionally, directors have no duty to disclose information to parties who should have been aware of the transaction. See Siegal v. Merrick,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 5 96,877, at 95,651 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (director has no duty to disclose personal loans from corporation since information was matter of
corporate record).
Courts have further limited the use of constructive deception by strictly construing the
"in connection with" requirement of Rule 10b-5. In Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977), the Third Circuit held that a causal connection must
exist between the alleged deception and the securities transaction. Id. at 1029. The Ketchurn court adopted the stricter causation test specifically in response to Santa Fe's concerns
about the federalization of state corporate law. Id.; accord, Halperin v. Edwards & Hanley,
430 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
1330, (D.D.C. 1977) (deception need only "touch" purchase or sale of security). See generally 1977-1978 Developments, supra note 85, at 816-21; PretrialDismissals, supra note 86,
at 62.
185

597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).

I' See text accompanying notes 192-198 infra.
187 Id. at 793.
' Id. at 791. The non-qualified option plan provided "key employees" with options to
purchase Zapata stock at $12.15 a share. Puchases could only be made in cash and the
employees could only exercise the options in five equal installments. Under the plan, the
board of directors could amend the plan in any fashion. Id.
88 Id. At the time of the tender offer Zapata common stock was selling for approximately $19 per share. Zapata's board authorized the repurchase of shares at $25 per share.

Id.
',

"

Id. at 792.

Id. The plaintiffs alleged injury to the corporation in the form of lost tax deduc-
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The Second Circuit held that the defendants did not deceive the corporation, since a majority of the directors ratifying the stock option plan
were disinterested and fully aware of all material facts surrounding the
transaction. 9 2 Thus, the corporation knew that its directors were overreaching and ratified their actions.193 The court ruled that a director is
disinterested if he has no direct pecuniary interest in the contested transaction and if he acts independently. If parties that would benefit from
a particular corporate action dominate or control a director, a conflict of
interest exists. 95 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that otherwise disinterested directors acquire a conflict of interest by aiding and
abetting 9" a violation of Rule 10b-5.197 The Maldonado court reasoned
that this bootstrapping theory would result in an unjustified expansion of
Rule 10b-5 into the area of corporate management. 98
In examining the status of each Zapata director,'99 the court held that
partnership in a law firm receiving substantial legal fees from a corporation does not create a conflict of interest in general corporate transactions. 0 0 While the Second Circuit conceded that his relationship might
lead the director to seek favor with corporate officers, the court ruled that
a vague possibility of conflict is not sufficient to nullify a director's
vote. 201 In order to be an interested party, a director must have voted for
tions. Since a corporation may deduct the difference between the option price and the market price as compensation to employees, I.R.C. § 162(a)(1), the plaintiffs contended that
allowing the defendants to exercise the stock options prior to the rise in market price resulted in lower deductions for Zapata. Id. See generally [1980] 2 FED. TAXEs ((P-H) 11,760
(deduction of stock option expenses).
192 597 F.2d at 795.
193 Id.; see text accompanying note 167 supra.
194 597 F.2d at 793; see text accompanying notes 199-204 infra.
195 597 F.2d at 793; see, e.g., Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 249 (7th Cir. 1977).
'9 Aiding and abetting under Rule 10b-5 imputes liability to parties who participated
in a fraudulent securities transaction but were not the primary violators of that rule. See
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 600 (1972).
See generally 1978-1979 Developments, supra note 41, at 911-923.
197 597 F.2d at 794 n.6.
19 Id. See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (§ 10(b) does
not prohibit non-deceptive corporate mismanagement).
19 The plaintiffs in Maldonado challenged the status of two of the four outside directors. The Second Circuit concluded that the director who also served as outside counsel for
Zapata had no conflict of interest. See text accompanying notes 186-191 infra. The second
director, Woolcott, used the inside information of Zapata's stock repurchase plan to indirectly purchase Zapata stock prior to the corporation's tender offer announcement. Id. The
plaintiffs contended that Woolcott was no longer disinterested after he engaged in conduct
similar to that of the defendants. Id. The Second Circuit speculated that Woolcott might
have approved the option plan amendments in an attempt to enlist management in a coverup scheme. The court failed to decide whether these circumstances would create a conflict of
interest since a majority of disinterested directors existed without him. Id. at 795.
20 597 F.2d at 794.
201

Id.
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a specific proposal in exchange for a direct benefit. 20 2 Anything less than
a quid pro quo arrangement, the court concluded, would make a director
conflict of interest standard unworkably vague. 203 Finally, the court reasoned that the director's election by the shareholders presumed that the
shareholders were willing to trust the director's judgment, despite the director's ties to Zapata.2 " In addition to establishing that the majority 205
of
the directors approving the amendments were financially disinterested,
the court found that Zapata's officers did not control or dominate the
outside directors.206 At the time of the transaction, the officers were not
20 7
controlling shareholders and did not dominate the outside directors.
Thus, the court presumed that the directors had acted independently. 208
The Maldonado decision comports with the standards for director
conflict of interest established by other courts. 209 The desire to retain personal control of a corporation, however, can potentially influence director
conduct more than specific financial enrichment. 210 Consequently, the
Second Circuit's pecuniary interest standard will effectively prevent many
otherwise meritorious shareholder derivative suits. 211 Despite this result,
the proof problems inherent in vague conflict of interest standards undermine the workability of such standards and could increase the amount of
vexatious litigation.
A judicial finding that the board of directors deceived the corporation
will cause the court to examine the materiality of the deception. 212 A misrepresentation or manipulative device is material if disclosure would have
significantly altered the total mix of information available to a resonable
investor.21 3 Implicit in this definition of materiality is the investor's ability, given knowledge of the withheld information, to have chosen an alter202

Id.

Id.; accord, Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
597 F.2d at 794.
20 The board meeting during which the Zapata directors approved the amendments to
the stock option plan involved only the four outside directors and the president of the corporation. Id. at 792. Although the president's presence was necessary for a quorum, he abstained from voting. Thus, the "disinterested" directors were the only parties voting on the
proposed amendments. Id. Under Delaware corporate law, a majority of those voting at a
board meeting can approve a transaction for the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §
144 (1975).
206 597 F.2d at 795.
207 Id.; cf. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 1977) (all directors controlled
by parent corporation).
108 597 F.2d at 795.
20 See, e.g., Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Cheff v.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 508, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (1968).
210 See Sherrard, supra note 159, at 710.
203
204

21 Id.
212 See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218 (2d Cir. 1977); Wright v. Heizer Corp.,
560 F.2d 236, 249 (7th Cir. 1977).
213 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). A fact is material if
a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable shareholder would consider the fact important in deciding how to vote. Id.; see note 53 supra.
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native course of action.2 14 Thus, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,21s
the Supreme Court held that shareholders alleging deception as a breach
of fiduciary duty must demonstrate the availability of a state remedy enjoining the corporate overreaching. 26 The Court left unresolved, however,
the standard a shareholder must satisfy to establish the utility of the
withheld information in obtaining injunctive relief in state court. 217 During the past year the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits addressed this issue
and adopted differing standards of proof.
In Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle,21 8 the Ninth Circuit held that
plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 derivative suits must prove that they would have
prevailed on the merits in a state injunctive action.2" 9 The Kidwell court
concluded that the mere availability of a state remedy establishes the materiality of the deception. 220 Although a finding of materiality creates the
presumption that the shareholder actually would have attempted to block
the contested transaction, 222 the court ruled that the shareholder must
additionally demonstrate that the state suit would have succeeded in order to satisfy the loss causation requirement of Rule 10b-5. 222 Thus, in
the Ninth Circuit, the parties in a constructive deception suit must fully
21, See Freshtman v. Schechtman, 450 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.

1066 (1972); Sherrard, supra note 160, at 712.
215 430 U.S. 462 (1977); see note 153 supra.
216 430 U.S. at 474-75 nn.14 & 15; see SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083,
1088-89 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See generally Note, Rule 10b-5: Deception
and Materiality Requirements in Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 66 GEo. L.J. 1593
(1978).
In establishing materiality in constructive deception suits, courts examine state remedies in existence at the time the plaintiff filed his suit. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d
209, 219 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs may not rely on an assertion that a state court would have
used the case to create new remedies for breaches of fiduciary duty. See Kerrigan v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 450 F. Supp. 639, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"' See Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 166, at 1893.
218 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
219 Id. at 1294. The Kidwell case arose out of the sale of the assets of a non-profit
corporation. Id. at 1280. Although the directors of the corporation concluded that the proposed sale did not require shareholder approval, the board solicited shareholder opinion in a
non-binding advisory vote. The shareholders rejected the terms of the deal, but the board
decided by a close vote to proceed with the sale. Id. at 1282. The plaintiff brought a derivative suit under Rule 10b-5 against several directors, alleging that directors' conflicts of interest created a duty of full disclosure to shareholders. Id. at 1285.
220 Id. at 1293. The Kidwell court concluded that the plaintiff's could have attempted
to block the sale of the corporation's assets on the statutory and common law grounds of
conflict of interest and unfairness. Id.; see IDAHO CODE § 30-142 (1977). Additionally, the
plaintiffs could have sought relief on the ground that the corporation's board did not have
the requisite number of representatives from the surrounding area. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs
might have sought to block the sale on the basis of the de facto merger doctrine. Id. See
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
221 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151-54 (1972) (finding of
materiality implies reliance). See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HAnv. L. REv. 584 (1975).
222 597 F.2d at 1294. But see text accompanying notes 247-256 infra.
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litigate the forum state's requirements for a grant of permanent injunctive relief.223 The court reasoned that Santa Fe's emphasis on the primacy of state law in remedying breaches of fiduciary duty requires federal
courts to adhere strictly to state standards in constructive deception
suits. 224 Recognizing that courts do not grant permanent injunctive relief
in every case, the Kidwell court apparently concluded that adopting a

standard less stringent than actual success would not
accurately reflect
225

the shareholder's potential for relief under state law.
In contrast to Kidwell, the Third Circuit in Healy v. Catalyst Recovery Systems, Inc. 226 held that plaintiffs in constructive deception suits do
not need to make a special showing of success in a state injunctive action
in order to establish loss causation. 22 7 The Healy court instead presumed
that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury. 228 The court
characterized the proof of success issue as an aspect of materiality.229
Noting that the theory of constructive deception assumes that the plaintiff wanted the withheld information to decide whether to seek injunctive
relief,230 the Third Circuit ruled that courts should gear the appropriate
standard to an assessment of what information a reasonable shareholder
would consider significant in deciding whether to institute a state action.23 1 Since the test for materiality has a decision making orientation,2 2
233 597 F.2d at 1294. In addition to permanent injunctive relief, the Kidwell court held
that a grant of damages in excess of an appraisal remedy would satisfy the causation element of Rule 10b-5. Id.
224 Id. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977).
225 597 F.2d at 1294. The Kidwell court stated that the question of whether a plaintiff
would have prevailed in a state action is essentially a question of fact. Id. The Ninth Circuit
ruled, however, that district courts should decide as a matter of law any state legal issues
that would have arisen in the hypothetical suit. Id.; cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
Amer., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (federal courts in Erie Doctrine cases should rely on trend
of state decisions in adopting new law for the state).
226 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FEM. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,268, at 96,890 (3d Cir.
1980).
217 Id. at 96,890. In Healey, the defendant corporation merged with a subsidiary. The
plaintiff, a minority stockholder of the subsidiary, alleged that the parent company'
breached its duty of disclosure by refusing to reveal information concerning the valuation of
the subsidiary's shares. Id.
"I Id. at 96,891; see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970); text
accompanying notes 247-256 infra.
21 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,268, at 96,890.
230 See text accompanying notes 177-184 supra.
231 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,268, at 96,890; text accompanying notes 262-265 infra.
'32 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (fact which would have
assumed actual significance in deliberations of reasonable shareholder is material). Although
Northway concerned an alleged violation of Rule 14a-9, courts apply Northway's materiality
standard in Rule 10b-5 cases. See, e.g., Joyce v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., 571 F.2d 703, 707 n.6
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). See generally Note, Materiality
under the Anti-FraudProvisions of the FederalSecurities Acts: How Much Disclosure?, 37
LA. L. REv. 1232 (1977).
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the Healy court reasoned that the appropriate standard issue must be
part of a court's materiality inquiry. 33
In assessing whether withheld information is material in a constructive deception context, the Healy court framed the question in terms of
what information would be important to a reasonable investor contemplating a state suit for injunctive relief.2 3 4 The court concluded that a
reasonable shareholder would not consider information material unless a
reasonable probability existed that the shareholder could have used the
information to obtain an injunction.2 5 The Third Circuit refused to
adopt Kidwell's actual success standard as an indicator of materiality.
The court contested Kidwell's conclusion that a standard less stringent
than actual success would violate Santa Fe's prohibition against federal
intrusion into state corporate law.2 36 The Healy court ruled that Santa
Fe's mandate applies the extension of the federal securities laws only to
conduct not covered by express statutory language. 3s Once the plaintiff
alleges a misrepresentation or omission, however, the court reasoned that
Santa Fe's holding is inapplicable. 23 1 In addition, the Third Circuit concluded that absolute certainty of success in a state action is both an impossible goal and impracticable standard for a jury to implement. 23 9 The
court reasoned that the reasonable probability of success standard is a
more workable standard for courts to apply since it is analogous to the
reasonable likelihood of ultimate success standard used in preliminary in24 0
junction decisions.
The Fifth Circuit, in Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. v.
American Fidelity Life Insurance Co.,24 1 also treated the appropriate
standard issue as an aspect of materiality rather than causation. 24 2 The
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,268, at 96,890.
Id.; see note 232 supra.
23 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,268, at 96,890. But see
text accompanying notes 262-265 infra.
226 See text accompanying note 224 supra
23 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,268, at 96,890.
138 Id.; accord, Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218 (2d Cir. 1977); Fiduciary Duty
Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 166, at 1884.
239 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,268, at 96,890.
240 Id. Courts grant preliminary injunctive relief upon a showing of irreparable injury or
reasonable probability of ultimate success. See Sandier v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 32 Del. Ch.
46, -, 79 A.2d 606, 610 (1951). See generally Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable
Injury Rule, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1065 (1970); Weinreich, Availability of PreliminaryInjunctive
Relief, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 263 (1979).
23

234

241 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979).
212 Id. at 614. In Alabama Farm, the directors of American Fidelity Life Ins. Co.
(AMFI) authorized a major repurchase of the corporation's shares. At the same time, the
Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Cas. Co. (Alabama Farm) began buying a substantial
amount of AMFI's stock. Id. at 607. After AMFI's directors authorized another major repurchase of the corporation's stock prior to fulfilling the first repurchase plan, Alabama Farm
filed a shareholder derivative suit. The suit alleged that the repurchase plans were manipulate devices designed to inflate the market price of AMFI's stock and discourage takeover
attempts. Id.
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Fifth Circuit concluded that predicating relief on proof of success in a
state action would in effect force a federal district court to conduct a full
trial of the state claim.2 43 The Alabama Farm majority further reasoned
that the mere establishment of a theoretical state claim is too speculative
a basis upon which to grant relief under the federal securities laws.244 The

court chose a middle ground and held that shareholder-plaintiffs in constructive deception suits must establish a prima facie case for state relief.245 The court characterized this standard as a practical
alternative to
2 46
the pitfalls inherent in the other courses of action.
Kidwell's requirement that plaintiffs prove actual success in a hypothetical state injunctive action in order to establish loss causation is inconsistent with the presumption of causation applicable in Rule 10b-5 actions.2 47 In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,24 8 the Supreme Court held

that courts should presume loss causation when a plausible causal nexus
exists between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.24 ' Although Mills involved an alleged ' 50 violation of section 14(a) of the '34
Act, lower courts have consistently applied its holding in Rule 10b-5 actions.25 1 Since the Mills court presumed that the defendant's misleading
proxy solicitations caused the plaintiff's loss, 2 52 the plaintiff did not have

to prove that the shareholders of the defendant corporation would have
actually defeated the proposed merger if management had fully disclosed
all material information surrounding the transaction.2 53 The fact that the
shareholders could have voted differently was sufficient to establish loss
causation. 25 Similarly, the possibility that a plaintiff could have at'1
244
245
246
21,

248

Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 249-257 infra.
396 U.S. 375 (1970).

2" Id. at 385. The Mills plaintiffs sought to set aside a merger between Electric AutoLite Co. and Mergenthaler Linotype Co. on the grounds that Auto-Lite's proxy statement
was materially misleading. Auto-Lite contended that the allegedly misleading proxy statement could not give rise to liability under the federal securities laws because the plaintiffs
could not establish that enough shareholders would have voted differently to defeat the
merger. Id. at 379.
250 The defendant in Mills appealed from an order denying a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 379.
26' See, e.g., Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Ind., 475 F.2d 516, 520-21 (7th Cir.
1973); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1247 (D. Del. 1978).
' ' 396 U.S. at 385.
2" Id.
254 Id. The minority shareholder's votes in Mills were necessary to approve the proposed merger. Id. at 379. The Mills Court expressly refrained from deciding whether a
plaintiff could establish causation when management controls a sufficient number of shares
to approve the transaction without any votes from the minority. Id. at 385 n.7. A majority of
lower courts have held that the absence of voting power does not preclude a plausible causal
nexus. The courts reason that full disclosure might have prompted injunctive actions and
more widespread exercise of appraisal rights. See, e.g., Cole v. Scheneley Indus., Inc., 563
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tempted to enjoin a proposed transaction provides the causal nexus necessary for the presumption of loss causation.255 By requiring plaintiffs to
prove loss causation through a demonstration of actual success in a hypothetical injunctive action, 50 the Kidwell court ignored the holding of
Mills and unjustifiably burdened plaintiffs in constructive deception
suits.
In determining whether the misrepresentation in a constructive deception suit is material, courts apply the materiality test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway.25 7 Information is
material, the Court held, if there is a substantial likelihood that the information would have assumed actual significance in a reasonable shareholder's deliberations regarding the appropriate course of action. 258 The
Court stated that the materiality test does not require that plaintiffs
show a substantial likelihood that the information would have caused the
reasonable investor to change his course of action.2159 Thus, in constructive deception suits, the proper test of materiality is whether the withheld
information would have assumed actual significance in a reasonable
shareholder's deliberations about whether to initiate a state injunctive
2 0
action. 1
The Third Circuit's reasonable probability of success standard is a
more stringent materiality test than Northway mandates. The Healy
court based the reasonable probability of success standard on the premise
that a reasonable shareholder would consider insignificant any information which did not at least indicate a reasonable probability of obtaining
injunctive relief.261 Under this standard, the fact that the shareholder
could establish a prima facie case for relief would be insignificant in that
shareholder's deliberations. Healy's premise, however, is flawed. Shareholders often initiate injunctive actions without knowledge of all the facts
surrounding the alleged overreaching.2 2 These plaintiff-shareholders rely
on discovery to fully develop their claim if the action survives the defendant's motion to dismiss. 20 8 Additionally, once an action proceeds beyond
the dismissal stage, the chances of a favorable out-of-court settlement improve greatly.2 0 Finally, although a shareholder may not ultimately perF.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1248 (D. Del. 1978).

See generally Note, Loss and Transaction Causation: The Second Circuit Resolves The
Causation Controversy in Majority Control Situations, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 683 (1975).
See generally FiduciaryDuty Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 166, at 1893-98.
' See text accompanying notes 219-226 supra.
257 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
28
259

26'
261
2

(1970).

Id.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 233 & 234 supra.
See text accompanying note 235 supra.
See 13 W. FLETCHER,

CYCLOPEDIA

OF
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§ 6021

Id.
See Note, Rule 23.1-The Need For Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
Approval of Proposed Settlements of ShareholderDerivative Actions, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 163,
283
28
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suade the court to enjoin a contested transaction, the unfavorable publicity ensuing from revelations in discovery or trial often deters
management from consumating a transaction for fear of damage to the
corporation's reputation, credit standing, or business image.26" As these
examples indicate, shareholders file suit more on the theory that the action will survive a motion to dismiss than on a reasonable certainty of
ultimate success. The Fifth Circuit's prima facie case standard best reflects what a reasonable shareholder would consider significant in deliberating whether to seek injunctive relief. Consequently, the prima facie case
standard is the best indicator of materiality in a constructive deception
action.
WALTER

D.

KELLEY, JR.

164 (1974).
261See Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions For Proxy Violations, 80
YALE L.J. 107, 117 (1970).

